China’s Compromise: the Environment vs the Economy

Author: Ushika K.

China’s role in the Climate Change Movement

China’s role in the climate crisis presents a unique case: being what is known as a ‘hybrid superpower’, the country has both developed and developing country attributes which together with its global influence, has led to China being at the forefront of the question “should developing countries be allowed to take the same carbon-emitting path as developed countries in pursuit of economic development?”

Air pollution in China is a key area of concern, as it is currently the world’s biggest source of carbon dioxide, responsible for around 28% of global emissions. This is seen to have a particularly detrimental impact to the populations of large cities, such as Beijing, with coal consumption being the leading cause accounting for just under two-thirds of Chinese energy consumption. Although climate change is emerging on China’s political agenda, emissions continued to rise throughout 2018 and 2019, despite an international shift away from fossil fuels. Furthermore, China continues to devote part of its public budget to financing fossil fuels, an estimated 15.42 billion USD. China’s relationship with its natural resources has a delicate balance between prosperity and environmental preservation, its rise to hybrid-superpower only highlighting the subsequent consequences of rapid epidemiological transition. China’s political power in relation to its use of fossil fuels is increasingly significant as not only is it a key polluter worldwide, it is also the biggest energy financier, financing fossil fuel development around the world. Its decision to curb its emissions will be a matter that is significant on a national as well as international scale.

Since implementing its Open-Door policy in 1978, China’s economy has expanded from less than $150 billion to over $13.6 trillion in 2018, resulting in a GDP increase from $156 to $9,771 and a reduction in poverty rate from 66% in 1990 to less than 1% today. These figures, at the expense of environmental quality, have come to define China’s status as a world superpower. However, this poses once again the moral question of development according to the Environmental Kuznets Curve, which describes that ‘in the early stages of industrialisation, economic growth is usually accompanied by environmental degradation, but eventually with environmental improvement in the stage of clean economy, a stage achieved by many developed countries but out of reach for most developing, who continue to be in the simultaneous increment of income and pollution.’ Applying this income-pollution relationship to China, we see that although the ‘fundamental way to improve environmental conditions is for a country to become rich in the long term, there is no empirical evidence to support the prediction that just one income-pollution relationship applies across all Chinese cities. Further, depending on particulate matters or emissions, the relationship with income can vary. Sulphur dioxide and carbon monoxide generally reveal an inverted-U relationship with income, while carbon dioxide emissions may display ‘N’ shaped patterns. Therefore, China’s position in both domestic and international environmental management is both crucial and a nuanced role, requiring policies dependent on local research and both top-down and grassroots contribution.

China faces international pressure to upgrade its climate targets. However, China’s president has also upped the ante, calling on all countries to ‘achieve a green recovery for the world economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic.’ This is a proactive step following the sharp rise and fall of China’s carbon emissions during February 2020. International environmental governance continues to ascend China’s political agenda, with China being an active partner in the UN 2030 Agenda, and a part of the UNFCCC since 1992. In 2011, China introduced new standards for coal power plant emissions, some of which more restricted than that of the EU, which have been successfully enforced as levels of particulate matter, nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide emissions from this sector are decreasing significantly despite continued growth in the power generation sector. It is evident that not only does China want to play a significant international role in climate mitigation, with its Council for International Cooperation on the Environment, but it also wants global perspective to recognise this. Xi Jinping’s climate pledge at the UN is believed by officials to be a ‘clearly bold and well-calculated move’, as it followed minutes after President Donald Trump’s speech. Li Shuo, an expert on Chinese climate policy from Greenpeace Asia, equated this move to demonstrate ‘Xi’s consistent interest in leveraging the climate agenda for geopolitical purposes.’ While international observers remain sceptical towards some of China’s initiatives – namely, the Belt and Road Initiative – Xi has introduced an ‘intriguing’ geopolitical question to these observers: ‘on a global common issue, China has moved ahead regardless of the US. Will Washington follow?’

Pressure on China to re-evaluate its current environmental policies is also being driven from community level. China aims to hit peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, following initiatives such as the National Emission Trading Scheme in 2017 and the Environmental Protection Tax Law. The Transformation Action Plan, which took place over 2014 to 2020, also directly addressed air quality and emissions reductions, key areas requiring urgent government action. The Chinese government has also applied international pressure into its policies, redirecting capital into renewable energy sources globally. In 2017, investment in renewable energy reached USD 127 billion, around 45% of the global investment in renewables that year. This is reflected in China’s new policy, launched in January 2019, which involved the ‘turbo-charging’ the development of ‘subsidy-free wind and solar projects’ in the world’s largest solar market. China is also indicated by the National Development and Reform Commission to be revising its target for domestic renewable energy to supply at least 35% of total electricity consumption by 2030. While these are ambitious objectives, China’s role in the international playing field in mitigating the effects of climate change is both significant and influential. China’s economic model represents a unique situation, and a better understanding of its geopolitical, socioeconomic and ecological environments will radically aid the integration of renewable energy policies into domestic policy and fostering an international framework promoting sustainable development offers a compromise between the income-pollution model which will benefit China, and the rest of the world.

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